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2Abstract: 
Grading inconsistency results from the application of different standards such that grades provide an 
inaccurate, and sometimes misleading, evaluation of student performance. Many attempts to correct for grading 
inconsistency have either not accurately corrected for inconsistency or have been too complicated to constitute 
politically feasible solutions to the problem. Within this context, Item Response Theory (IRT) is offered as a 
solution to grading inconsistency. IRT corrects for inconsistencies in the distributions yielded by the various 
grading practices of professors and departments as well as the failure of current practices to accurately account 
for differing student quality by course. 
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3I. Introduction 
 
“For students, the currency of academia is the grade. As the only tangible 
benefit that students receive for performing well in their courses, grades 
provide the primary mechanism available to faculty for maintaining academic 
standards. In a very real sense, professors pay grades to students in return for 
mastery of course material, and students barter these grades for jobs or 
entrance into professional or graduate school. 
 
“In the early 1960’s, student grades, like the dollar, were taken off the gold 
standard. Over the course of the next thirty-five years, inflation led to 
significant decreases in the value of both college grades and the dollar….It 
[grade inflation] damaged the system by drawing attention away from a much 
more serious flaw in the academic monetary system: It masked wild 
fluctuations in the exchange rates between academic departments.” (Johnson 
2003; 196) 
 
This project will deal with grading inconsistency. Grading inconsistency results from 
the application of different standards (whether by professor or department) such that grades 
provide an inaccurate, and sometimes misleading, evaluation of student performance. The 
problem of grading inconsistency is related to, but not the same as, the more commonly 
debated, hot-button issue of grade inflation. Grade inflation is defined as a general upward 
trend over the years in grades at colleges and universities nationwide that is frequently 
considered as reflective of lowering academic standards. Grade inflation is not synonymous 
with grading inconsistency because if professors uniformly raised (or “inflated”) grades, then 
consistency in grading practices would be preserved. However, in practice this does not 
occur; while some faculty members proceed to give out higher student grades, other faculty 
members will adamantly maintain previous grading levels (or even become more stringent in 
reaction). And, whether the issue is grade inflation or grading inconsistency—the core 
concern is the same; namely, that grades become so unreliable as to be meaningless. 
Thus, the debates are intricately related—it would be difficult to discuss grading 
inconsistency without simultaneously addressing grade inflation. However, the focus of this 
4paper will be on resolving grading inconsistency. If grades were only inflated, they could still 
constitute accurate indicators of relative student performance with the application of some 
fairly simple adjustments. However, when inconsistency is added to the equation, acquiring 
an accurate understanding of a student’s academic performance becomes far more difficult. 
Grading inconsistency is not entirely a bad thing. Grades are assigned to serve a 
number of functions; they may be used to assess the quality of a student’s performance, 
provide students with motivation to complete coursework, and to encourage or discourage 
students from taking a particular course. Given this myriad of objectives, it is hardly 
surprising that professors often choose to strike a different balance and assign grades on 
differing bases. Indeed, a tremendous advantage of grades is the flexibility with which they 
provide professors in shaping the atmosphere of individual courses. 
Nevertheless, if left unadjusted, such grading inconsistency has negative 
consequences. There are three reasons why this problem warrants attention: it affects 
students during their time at the college, it affects students when they leave school for the 
workforce or graduate school, and it affects the ability of teachers to instruct effectively. 
Accordingly, this paper will seek to develop a method whereby student’s grades with 
different professors or in different departments can reasonably be compared. 
This paper will proceed as follows: Section II reviews previous scholarship which has 
demonstrated the existence of grading inconsistency at some schools. Section III discusses 
the impact of grading inconsistency and why it is an issue worth remedying. Section IV 
examines proposals which have been forwarded to address the issue and explains why each 
of them either fails to accurately correct for grading inconsistency or is too complicated 
mathematically to constitute a politically feasible policy. Section V explains Item Response 
Theory and argues that it constitutes the best approach to address grading inconsistency. 
5Section VI provides a simulation using data from Macalester College to demonstrate the 
efficacy of one grade adjustment method. Section VII concludes and recommends that 
Macalester include an adjusted class rank based upon Item Response Theory.  
II. Studies Establishing the Existence of Grading Inconsistency 
 
Within the literature on grading inconsistency, two basic methodologies are 
employed to establish its existence—those which are exogenous, relying on external 
measures of student ability, and those which are endogenous, relying exclusively upon grades 
themselves. The initial investigations of the topic relied upon exogenous measures such as 
standardized test scores and high school GPA.  
Goldman, Schmidt, Hewitt and Fisher (1974) used three variables (SAT Math score, 
SAT Verbal score and high school GPA) to predict the grade point of students taking 
courses in different disciplines at the University of California, Riverside, during the 1972-
1973 academic year. From the three predictor variables, Goldman et. al.  derive a single 
variable, which they refer to as the student’s “ability profile”. Predicted GPA by department 
is then plotted against this ability profile (all fitting was done using linear regression). The 
resulting plot showed a series of lines separated at times by as much as 0.8 units of projected 
GPA (on a 4.0 scale; see Figure 1).  
Spanish emerged as the most lenient grading of the departments. The History, 
Psychology and Sociology departments also graded more leniently than average. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the Economics, Anthropology, Biochemistry, Chemistry and 
Mathematics departments were the more severely grading departments. 
6Figure 1: Translation of ability profile to projected GPA by department for students at the University of 
California, Riverside, during the 1972-1973 academic year 
Source: Goldman, Roy D., Schmidt, Donald E., Hewitt, Barbara Newlin, Fisher, Ronald. (1974), “Grading 
Practices in Different Major Fields.” American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn), p. 343-357. 
 
While it is possible to observe general trends such as the above, precise statements 
on the relative difficulty of grading in different departments are not possible due to the non-
parallel nature of the lines translating “ability profile” to projected GPA. The Economics 
line, for example, is relatively flat, meaning that either the department does a poor job 
distinguishing between students or that prior measured abilities have little effect on 
performance in the discipline. On the other extreme, the line for Mathematics is quite steep, 
meaning that the department does distinguish well between students and that high ability 
7students (at least as indicated by high school GPA and SAT score) are likely to perform 
better. 
 Subsequently, studies have tended to focus more on endogenous measures of 
grading inconsistency. Exogenous measures are subject to severe limitations.  High school 
GPA is of limited utility because high school students are competing with a much broader 
population; students at the same university likely represent a small sliver of that broad high 
school population and are therefore likely to have similar GPAs. Thus, although high school 
curriculum is more standardized than at the college level, it will fail to sort well between like-
ability students. Moreover, there is substantial inconsistency in grading between high schools 
which makes comparison difficult. SAT, on the other hand, aims at too low a cognitive level 
to accurately reflect the ability of top students and has come under heavy scrutiny for 
potential racial and gender biases (Young 2003; Leonard and Jiang 1999). Ultimately, 
exogenous measures are limited because they are only as meaningful as the measures they 
rely upon. Thus, the shortcomings of high school GPA and the SAT as ability measures 
represent shortcomings in exogenous measures of ability.  
The basis for the endogenous literature on grading inconsistency is work done by 
Goldman and Widawki (1976). In their paper, Goldman and Widawski were the first authors 
to employ what they term a “with-in subjects technique” to determine the extent of grading 
inconsistency. The technique used data from the spring quarter of 1973 at the University of 
California, Riverside, to construct pairwise comparisons of grades received by the same 
student within different departments. If a student had taken courses in two different 
departments, the student’s average grade in each department was determined. The resulting 
difference was combined with those of other students, and the unweighted mean of the 
group was then taken as the net grading bias between the two departments. The authors 
8compensate for the tendency of individual strengths and weaknesses to effect the direction 
and magnitude of the resulting differential by aggregating data from a large number of 
students spread throughout the college.  
 Goldman and Widawski’s analysis produced two important findings. The first 
finding was that grading inconsistency did, in fact, exist. The second finding was that the 
grade differentials between departments were transitive; thus, if Biology is 0.2 tougher than 
Chemistry which is 0.3 tougher than Physics, then Biology will be approximately 0.5 tougher 
than Physics. This property allowed the authors to construct a “Grading Index” centered at 
zero, where more difficult departments had negative coefficients and the more lenient 
departments had positive coefficients (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Grading Index showing the degree of grading inconsistency at the University of California, Riverside 
during the Spring quarter of 1973 
Combined Major Fields Grading Index 
Anthropology -.09 
Art .22 
Biology -.53 
Chemistry -.36 
Economics .18 
English -.10 
Ethnic Studies .38 
Foreign Language .06 
Geology -.30 
History .05 
Mathematics -.07 
Philosophy .17 
Physics -.23 
Political Science -.03 
Psychology .03 
Sociology .29 
Urban Studies .38 
Source: Golman, Roy D. and Widawski, Mel H. (1976), “A Within-Subjects Technique for Comparing College 
Grading Standards: Implications in the Validity of the Evaluation of College Achivement.” Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, Vol. 36, p. 381-390.  
 
9This transitivity is not trivial. It is possible to construct a very simple scenario where 
it would not hold, as shown in Table 2. While this type of scenario unfolds in individual 
cases, the mean behavior of the student body still balances out such that department 
differentials are transitive. 
Table 2: Basic scenario where grade transitivity does not hold 
Student Biology 1 Chemistry 1 Physics 1 
Al A  B 
Beth B A  
Charlie  B A 
The methodology employed by Goldman and Widawski has its limitations. To 
demonstrate the largest shortcoming, let’s consider a pairwise comparison between the Art 
and Mathematics departments. In doing the comparison, the method does not consider 
whether the students taking both courses tend to be Mathematics or Art majors. If, 
hypothetically, Art majors were far more likely to take Mathematics courses than 
Mathematics majors were to take Art courses, and if we assume students perform better 
within their major, the Mathematics courses are likely to appear to be more difficult than Art 
courses. This concern is particularly relevant given the different skill sets which the two 
departments draw upon. This shortcoming would later be remedied by Johnson (2003), who 
considered the direction of the comparison and found that grading discrepancies persisted. 
Despite its limitations, the study represented an advance because it relied exclusively upon 
grade data (instead of on external indicators of student ability such as standardized test 
scores and high school GPA).  
A series of follow-up studies was done at Dartmouth College during the 1980’s 
based upon the method used by Goldman and Widawski (1976). The first study, by A. 
Christopher Strenta and Rogers Elliot (1987), used data from the graduating class of 1983. 
10
Their results confirmed those of Goldman and Widawski: substantial differentials between 
departments emerged and these differentials once again proved to be additive. A subsequent 
study by the same authors (Elliot and Strenta, 1988) confirmed these findings (see Table 3) 
and suggested remedying departmental biases through an additive adjustment. This remedy 
will be considered later, when grade adjustment methods are addressed. 
Table 3: Department adjustment constants for the Dartmouth class of 1986. 
(Note: Positive constants represent more leniently grading departments, while negative 
coefficients represent more strictly grading departments). 
 
Department Additive Constant 
Anthropology .00 
Art/Visual Studies .06 
Asian Studies .12 
Biology -.32 
Chemistry/Biochemistry -.35 
Comparative Literature .31 
Drama .37 
Earth Science .02 
Economics -.44 
English .05 
Engineering  -.16 
French & Italian .08 
Geography -.16 
German -.07 
Government -.19 
Greek & Roman Studies .05 
History -.07 
Math/Computer Science -.37 
Music .29 
Philosophy -.07 
Physics -.25 
Policy Studies .09 
Psychology -.16 
Religion .03 
Russian .02 
Sociology .25 
Spanish .20 
Source: Elliot and Strenta. Rogers and A. Christopher. 1988. “Effects of Improving the Reliability of the GPA 
on Prediction Generally and on Comparative Predictions for Gender and Race Particularly.” Journal of 
Educational Measurement, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Winter). p. 333-347. 
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The non-parallel nature of the lines found in Goldman et. al. (1974) demonstrates an 
important limitation of the studies done by Strenta and Elliot (1987) and Elliot and Strenta 
(1988). Their comparison of disciplines assumes that an additive adjustment is sufficient to 
remedy the differences in grading practices across departments. However, the work of 
Goldman et al. (1974) demonstrates that both a multiplicative and an additive component 
would be necessary to translate different grades to a 'common currency' or single uniform 
scale reflecting relative student achievement. 
In all of these studies a common thread emerges. Courses in economics, 
mathematics and the sciences are graded more stringently, courses in the humanities tend to 
be graded more leniently, and courses in the social sciences (except for economics) tend to 
lie somewhere in the middle. These general trends appear to hold at Macalester as well. 
Table 4 shows average grades by department at Macalester over the last five years. 
The figures within this table are troubling. An average student in Chemistry, for 
example, will likely rank in the tenth percentile of the graduating class1. An average student 
in Economics will likely rank in the fifteenth percentile of the graduating class and an 
average student in Biology will rank in the twentieth percentile of the graduating class.  
While individuals may have differing perceptions of the strength of students in 
various departments, I would venture to say that few, if any, would seriously make the claim 
that the mathematics, science and economics students at Macalester and other universities 
consistently prove to be the poorest students by such a large margin. And, even if there were 
no significant difference in grading practices by department, there would still exist 
differences in practice by professor. This inconsistency alone is sufficient to justify some 
form of adjustment. 
 
1 Data comes from the Macalester College Factbook produced by Institutional Research, which provides 
the distribution of graduating grade point averages.  
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Table 4: Grade Point Average by department at Macalester, Spring 2002-Spring 2006. 
Department 
Spring 
2002 
Spring 
2003 
Spring 
2004 
Spring 
2005 
Spring 
2006 
Neuroscience and Cognitive Studies - - - 3.80 3.91 
Education 3.72 3.71 3.72 3.60 3.72 
American Studies - - - 3.40 3.69 
Russian Studies 3.48 3.27 3.43 3.42 3.64 
English 3.50 3.58 3.52 3.46 3.63 
History 3.40 3.48 3.39 3.40 3.61 
Geography 3.42 3.57 3.52 3.48 3.60 
Anthropology 3.55 3.57 3.45 3.54 3.59 
Art 3.57 3.57 3.63 3.66 3.59 
Music 3.36 3.43 3.58 3.58 3.58 
Theatre and Dance 3.52 3.64 3.33 3.48 3.57 
Asian Studies 3.49 3.58 3.74 3.86 3.55 
Japanese Program 3.37 3.49 3.49 3.41 3.51 
Religious Studies 3.51 3.65 3.56 3.61 3.51 
International Studies 3.34 3.23 3.38 3.30 3.50 
Psychology 3.39 3.44 3.52 3.47 3.50 
Environmental Studies 3.69 3.30 3.57 3.39 3.48 
Political Science 3.55 3.41 3.59 3.48 3.48 
Sociology 3.55 3.57 3.50 3.48 3.48 
Women’s & Gender Studies 3.54 3.51 3.43 3.38 3.48 
Hispanic & Latin American Studies 3.49 3.59 3.40 3.44 3.45 
Classics 3.38 3.37 3.52 3.48 3.43 
German Studies 3.21 3.25 3.37 3.49 3.43 
French & Francophone Studies 3.36 3.33 3.28 3.39 3.41 
Mathematics/Computer Science 3.26 3.30 3.34 3.28 3.40 
Physics/Astronomy 3.40 3.31 3.39 3.35 3.40 
Humanities/Media/Cultural Studies 3.56 3.32 3.60 3.35 3.36 
Philosophy 3.46 3.34 3.45 3.47 3.31 
Linguistics Program 3.64 3.43 3.56 3.23 3.29 
Geology 3.15 3.56 3.18 3.29 3.26 
Biology 3.10 3.32 3.35 3.28 3.24 
Economics 3.03 3.14 3.17 3.20 3.17 
Chemistry 3.19 3.13 3.06 3.17 3.03 
All College 3.39 3.43 3.44 3.41 3.46 
Source: Institutional Research, Macalester College. 
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III. The Impact of Grading Inconsistency 
 
As explained in the introduction, grading inconsistency is not entirely a bad thing—it 
represents the reality of different professors teaching different course levels and using grades 
to achieve different objectives. This section, however, will explore the ways in which, if left 
unadjusted, this inconsistency can have negative consequences. First, I will discuss the 
impact it has on students at the college—in selection of both major discipline as well as 
elective courses. Second, I will discuss the impact that inconsistency has on students when 
they enter the workforce as well as its impact on potential employers. Finally, I will discuss 
how it impacts faculty by creating pressure to continually assign higher grades.  
A. Grading Inconsistency and the Undergraduate Experience 
 
First, let’s examine the impact of grading inconsistency on a student’s undergraduate 
experience. Coupled with conversations with professors and peers, grades serve to indicate a 
student’s aptitude for particular subject areas. Understandably, students tend to gravitate 
toward departments where they receive good grades. Similarly, they will drift away from 
departments where they receive poor grades. This is usually a healthy process—interests and 
abilities don’t always overlap and students can adjust accordingly. However, this process 
becomes complicated when there is a discrepancy in how grades are applied by professors or 
departments.  
Let’s consider the hypothetical case of a student, Sue, interested in Physics, who 
receives a B in an introductory Physics course (while the rest of the class receives a 
combination of B’s and C’s). Meanwhile, Sue takes a leniently graded Mathematics course 
and is awarded an A- (while the rest of the class receives either an A or A-). After seeing the 
grades, Sue decides to study Mathematics. The decision could be based upon a few factors: 
14
Sue could lack the context to understand that her Physics grade actually represents a superior 
performance, Sue could still feel dissatisfied with the Physics grade even after 
contextualization, or Sue could be fully satisfied but fear that outside observers would see 
the Physics grade as an inferior performance. Regardless of the motivation for the decision 
an unfortunate process unfolds, where Sue is driven away from a discipline (Physics) in 
which she have greater interest and seemingly greater talent. And, while the process is not 
always so simple, it unfolds on a regular basis on campuses around the country.  
 The point of the example stated above is not to criticize the physics professor for 
giving poor grades or the math professor for giving high grades. Nor is the point to criticize 
any department for giving higher or lower grades, on average, to students. These processes 
unfold naturally within any university environment. The point is that students should be 
given the context to understand what grades indicate about their abilities such that they can 
make informed decisions about their future accordingly.  
Let’s consider a second example. This time our hypothetical student, Dave, is a 
senior, pre-Med and needs to fulfill a Fine Arts requirement. For the sake of simplicity, there 
happen to be only two available courses which satisfy the requirement: Creative Writing and 
Art History. Dave is initially inclined to take the Creative Writing course, as it will likely 
provide much-needed improvement to his writing skills. However, after speaking to a few 
friends, Dave changes his mind. The Creative Writing professor has a reputation as an 
unusually severe grader; Dave, who had wanted to take the course precisely because he needs 
to improve his writing skills, is sure that he can’t achieve a grade higher than B- (the average 
grade in the course). This poor grade, when factored into Dave’s cumulative GPA, will 
negatively affect his chances of admission to medical school. Meanwhile, the professor of art 
history has a reputation as a lenient grader, where the average grade is A-. Dave takes Art 
15
History and receives the desired grade, but there is something distressing in this example. 
Dave was forced to make an undesirable choice between maximizing his educational 
experience and maximizing his chances of admission to medical school. 
This basic process unfolds on a regular basis. Students may not choose courses solely 
based upon grading considerations, but grades do play a part in the decision-making process. 
As one Macalester student explains: “I did take a lot of classes from Professor X and it 
certainly didn’t hurt that I knew he was an easy grader. It functioned as a schedule filler…it 
was nice to have classes that you didn’t have to put too much work into.” Thus, 
inconsistency is advantageous in that it helps regulate workload (although workload can also 
be regulated by careful course selection based upon the assignments listed within the 
syllabus).  
However, this process is troubling not only because it moves students away from 
course choices which would maximize their undergraduate experience, but also because of 
the effect of this shift in course enrollment. Severe grading relative to the norm has a two-
pronged deflationary effect upon course enrollment. Students are deterred from registering 
for a course in the first place for fear of receiving a poor grade, while students who take the 
course and receive a poor grade may be deterred from taking subsequent courses in a 
sequence, with that particular professor, or within the department as a whole. A study by 
Valen Johnson (2002) at Duke University during the late 1990’s found an estimated 
reduction in student enrollment in Math and Science courses as high as fifty percent. 
Unfortunately, little systematic data exists to determine the magnitude of shifts in major 
choices or course choices within majors. Nevertheless, the impact on elective courses alone 
has significant ramifications for both students and faculty.  
16
The impact of such a decrease in enrollment on students is progressive. First, it 
decreases the number of students able to work in professions requiring a Math or Science 
background as well as decreasing the scientific competency of the general population (Neal 
2006). In addition, as course enrollments fall, Math and Science departments are able to hire 
fewer faculty members. As fewer job opportunities become available at universities, students 
may be less inclined to pursue Math and Science (at least at the Ph.D. level). One risk of 
such a decrease in Math and Science education is that it could affect national scientific 
competitiveness, which is critical because: “In today’s global economy, the ability of the 
United States to remain competitive relies increasingly on our ability to develop and 
commercialize innovative technologies.” (Jeffrey 2006) 
 
B. Grading Inconsistency and the Post-Graduate Experience 
 
Grading inconsistency also negatively affects both employers and students, 
particularly traditionally disadvantaged students, because it undermines the potential of 
grades to serve as accurate evaluative tools. While grades are far from perfect measures of 
academic performance, they are preferable to the alternatives: test scores and networking.  
 
When all students receive high marks, graduate schools and business recruiters 
simply start ignoring the grades. That leads the graduate schools to rely more on 
entrance tests. It prompts corporate recruiters to depend on a "good old boy/girl" 
network in an effort to unearth the difference between who looks good on paper and 
who is actually good. 
 
Put to disadvantage in that system are students who traditionally don't test as well or 
lack connections. In many cases, those are the poor and minority students who are 
the first in their families to graduate from college. No matter how hard they work, 
their A's look ordinary. (USA Today 2002) 
 
As grading inconsistency forces an increased reliance on test scores and connections, 
traditionally disadvantaged groups of students will lose the opportunity to demonstrate their 
17
ability through receiving exemplary grades. Employers, on the other hand, will end up 
settling for potentially less qualified employees, since applicants’ college performance is 
obscured by grading inconsistency. 
C. The Impact of Grading Inconsistency on Professors 
 
In assigning grades, professors are traditionally compelled to reconcile two 
competing goals. While lenient grades will serve to attract a greater number of students, 
severe grades will encourage those students who do enroll to take the course seriously and 
complete coursework in a thorough and timely manner. Some professors navigate this 
conflict by only using grades in pursuit of only one of these ends; however, this strategy can 
put them at a disadvantage. If they grade leniently to attract students, they are robbed of an 
effective motivating tool. Instead of leveraging a student’s grade, these professors are forced 
to fall back on more informal motivators: coaxing and empty threats. Professors who grade 
with sufficient severity to motivate students, on the other hand, put themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to their peers in attracting students. Even if the severely 
grading professor offers an attractive syllabus and convenient course times, other professors 
still offer the comparative advantage of more lenient grading. This competitive incentive can 
produce a “race to the bottom” where coursework expectations continue to fall and grades 
continue to rise as professors strive to keep pace with their peers. It should be noted that 
everyone is worse off in this case: grades no longer act as an enrollment incentive if all 
professors give similarly high grades, nor are they able to function as a motivating tool since 
students can now predict that they will receive high grades regardless of performance. The 
scenario has the characteristics of a classic collective action problem. No individual 
18
professor is at fault, and individual decisions to offer better grades are rational. An effective 
solution can therefore only come from action by the college as a whole. 
 Stringent grading also has been shown to negatively affect the course evaluations 
received by professors. In a study at Duke University, Valen Johnson (2003) showed that 
there was a strong connection between grading practices and the course evaluations received 
by professors. 
 
Student responses to the survey were significantly affected by the grades that 
the students either expected to receive or already had received. For most 
items, the influence that students’ grades had on their responses to the survey 
ranged from about one-fourth to one-half the importance of the consensus 
rating variable estimated from the responses collected from all students who 
took the course. This suggests that although the consensus opinion of 
instructional attributes was the most important predictor of students’ 
responses to an item, grades do, in fact, represent a serious bias to student 
evaluations of teaching. (Johnson 2003, 100)   
 
Johnson suggested that the bulk of the change in evaluations stemming from grades could 
be explained by “grade attribution theory”, where students associate bad grades with bad 
teaching and associate good grades with good teaching (Johnson 2003, 100). Johnson’s study 
is hardly the first to examine the connection between grades and course evaluations. 
However, it is relatively unique in that it used an experimental instead of an observational 
format2: course evaluations were given to students before and after the distribution of final 
grades such that the main explanation for changes in perception would have to be related to 
the grades received by students.3
The cumulative impact of grading inconsistency on faculty who grade with relative 
stringency is that they receive both poor course evaluations and lower course enrollments. 
 
2 The handful of other experimental studies, such as those conducted by Holmes (1972), Vasta and Sarmiento 
(1979), and Chacko (1983), produced similar results. 
3 For a more complete survey of research examining the connection between grades and course evaluations, 
see Chapter 3 of Valen Johnson’s book Grade Inflation (Johnson 2003). 
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Thus, these professors are “less likely to receive tenure, salary increases, and promotions” 
(Johnson 2003, 9) not because they teach poorly but simply because they approach grading 
differently than their colleagues. 
IV. Taking Action 
 
Each of these factors taken in isolation—the impact of grading inconsistency on 
undergraduate experience, on post-graduate opportunities and the negative impact on 
faculty—would warrant action to remedy the issue; the combination of all three makes the 
value of taking action even greater.  
The most common proposal is that the change should come from the professors 
themselves or the departments. This proposal is both untenable and ill-advised. It is 
untenable because the process of coordinating grading practices among dozens of professors 
or a number of different departments would be a logistical nightmare unless a strict curve 
with a set average was required for all courses. It is ill-advised because it interferes with 
individual professors, who ought to have basic autonomy in crafting their approach to 
teaching.   
Any effective strategy to remedy grading inconsistency must be implemented by the 
college or university at the institutional level. As the central repository for grade information, 
the college possesses the ability to provide sufficient information to contextualize grades 
such that performance is measured appropriately. This adjustment does not endorse the use 
of grades to measure academic performance. Instead it recognizes that grades are currently 
used as measures of academic performance and, given this reality, seeks to minimize the 
potentially deceptive effects of grading inconsistency.  
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This is not entirely uncharted territory; a few pioneering schools have undertaken 
efforts to alter grading practices. In the subsequent sections, schools which have 
implemented a particular grading reform are noted and their success in altering grading 
behavior is evaluated.  
The review will proceed as follows. First, I will examine proposals which target only 
grade inflation. Next, I will examine proposals which seek to address both grade inflation 
and grading inconsistency. Finally, I will examine proposals only concerned with addressing 
grading inconsistency. Within each section there is no precise ordering, although I will 
generally try to examine policies in increasing order of sophistication (or complication, 
depending on your perspective). 
A. Anti-Grade Inflation Policies 
i. Inclusion of Class Rank 
 
This past fall (of 2006), the University of Colorado became the latest university to 
publicly hash out the grade inflation debate. University President Hank Brown took the lead 
in a charge to change the college’s policies to contain grade inflation. He argued that the 
college should include either a class ranking or grade percentile (within the student body) on 
the transcript so that employers and graduate schools could accurately contextualize a 
student’s GPA (Brown 2006a). After a lively debate, where the proposal received largely 
positive treatment from the media (most notably from Kurtz 2006), the Board of the college 
opted for a compromise: class rank would be disclosed with transcripts, but only at the 
request of students (Brown 2006c). The compromise was reached following “spirited protest 
from professors who opposed tougher, mandatory remedies to curb grade inflation.” 
(Brown 2006c) 
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Colorado is only the most recent case where political pressure from faculty has 
foreclosed the possibility of more fundamental changes to grading practices. This is not to 
say that lively debate from different perspectives is bad, but solutions such as the one 
adopted by Colorado have more symbolic value than actual impact. Including class rank on a 
student’s transcript upon request is a positive step but a small one. Class rank does allow 
outsiders to evaluate the relative performance of a student better than GPA alone. However, 
it is unlikely to do much to address grade inflation. Students would have to decide that it is 
in their interest to pressure professors to distribute lower grades and professors would have 
to respond accordingly—a relatively implausible scenario. More problematically, class rank 
does nothing to adjust for grading inconsistency within a graduating class and, thus, can give 
an incorrect impression of the relative standing of students within the institution.  
ii. Restricting Students Who Graduate With Honors  
 
Some say Harvard students are better these days and deserve higher grades. 
But if they are in some measures better, the proper response is to raise our 
standards and demand more of our students. Cars are better-made now than 
they used to be. So when buying a car, would you be satisfied with one that 
was as good as they used to be? (Mansfield 2001) 
 
Nowhere has the debate over grade inflation been more intense or more highly 
publicized than at the Ivy League schools. Harvard, in particular, came under scrutiny in 
2001 when it was revealed that 91% of students had graduated with some sort of honors 
(Healy 2001). While Harvard does not necessarily give substantially higher grades, on 
average, than its peer schools, it was unique in that it combined such high GPA’s with lower 
GPA thresholds for receiving honors. Peer schools, such as Yale and Princeton, granted 
honors to approximately half as many students (Healy 2001).  
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The resulting controversy produced two grade-related reforms at Harvard. The first 
reform was to abolish Harvard’s idiosyncratic 15-point grading system which weighted the 
gap between an A- (14 points) and a B+ (12 points) twice as much as the gap between an A 
(15 points) and an A- (Healy 2002). The idea was to encourage more professors to make the 
downward adjustment to a B+ (from an A-) as the gap would no longer be as large 
(Crenshaw 2002). The second reform was to cap the number of honors degrees while 
encouraging professors to give fewer A’s. Under the new policy only 60% of students would 
be eligible to receive honors, and professors would be notified if their grading standards 
differed unreasonably from those of other professors at the college (Meyer 2005).  
These reforms appear to have done little to impact grading practices at Harvard. 
Students still receive A’s at approximately the same rate (Boston Globe 2004) and mean 
GPA for graduating students has decreased only from 3.42 to 3.41 (Meyer 2005).  
iii. Deemphasizing grading  
 
Some colleges have managed to control grade inflation without resorting to any 
particular policy remedy, by establishing a culture conducive to more severe grading. The 
most notable example is Reed College, a selective liberal arts college in Oregon, where the 
mean GPA is a relatively meager 2.90 (Neal 2006). At Reed, grades are largely removed from 
the learning process.  
 
Papers and exams are generally returned to students with lengthy comments 
but without grades affixed. (Reed 2007)  
 
Additionally, students do not receive their grades at the end of each semester as at most 
colleges; instead they only receive their grades upon request. 
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While Reed is an exemplar in controlling grade inflation, it also demonstrates the 
danger of such a policy.  
 
Colin S. Diver, Reed's president, says graduate schools worried about their 
rankings are becoming less willing to take students with lower grades because 
they make the graduate schools appear less selective. 
 
''If they admit someone with a 3.0 from Reed who is in the upper half of the 
class, that counts against them, even if it is a terrific student,'' Mr. Diver said. 
(Arenson 2004) 
 
The argument made by Diver is a refrain among those who oppose efforts to end grade 
inflation. While it may be a good idea in theory to adjust for grade inflation, the argument 
goes, it can’t be done without hurting the students of that particular university. Given this 
concern, efforts which put greater emphasis on grading inconsistency rather than grade 
inflation may be more prudent.  
B. Policies Addressing Both Grading Inconsistency and Grade Inflation 
 
Not all efforts to address grading practices have been limited to grade inflation 
measures. A few daring schools have adopted measures far stronger than those pursued by 
Harvard and Colorado. 
i. Median Grades  
 
A commonly proposed strategy, which few schools have chosen to pursue, is to 
include median grades for each course next to a student’s grade so that an outside observer 
can gauge the relative difficulty of each of the student’s courses. One school, Dartmouth, 
has included both the median grade for each course as well as the course size on all student 
transcripts since 1994. Unfortunately, the proposal has been unsuccessful in controlling 
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grade inflation; the average grade point has actually risen at Dartmouth over that span from 
3.25 to 3.33 (Gardner 2002).  
 While the inclusion of additional information could be helpful in contextualizing a 
student’s grades, this method has two critical shortcomings as a correction for grading 
inconsistency. First, it fails to provide any indication of the strength of other students in a 
course. A grade equivalent to the median grade in a course with all top students would be 
quite an impressive performance, while receiving the median grade in a course with weaker 
students represents a notably lower performance. Certainly it is possible to make some 
estimate of average student strength according to course level and content, but this risks 
providing a misleading picture of student achievement if the composition of a course is at all 
counter-intuitive. Second, the process of trying to contextualize over thirty different grades 
is unwieldy. For each course, the evaluator is required to make a somewhat complex and 
imprecise approximation of the “true” achievement that a particular grade represents. In 
practice, then, the inclusion of median grade and course size is likely to do little to aid those 
on the outside in understanding a student’s grades other than to create confusion. 
ii. ‘A’ Quotas 
 
In 2004, professors at Princeton voted to impose a quota on the number of A’s 
given at the college, setting a loose cap at 35% of all grades (Brown 2006b). The initiative 
has been at least somewhat successful, as the percentage of A’s awarded fell from 46% to 
41% in the first year after the initiative (Mount 2005). Moreover, while the proposal on face 
only targets grade inflation, it will likely impact grading inconsistency as well. Professors are 
being pushed to give a more uniform percentage of A’s in a each course, meaning that 
professors will be forced to assign grades in a more consistent manner. Additionally, this 
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policy decreases grading inconsistency produced by the assignment of large quantities of A’s, 
which fail to distinguish between excellent and more average performances. 
However, the policy still appears to have its limitations. First, despite trending in the 
right direction, the number of A’s awarded at Princeton still exceeded the cap by 6% in 
2005, meaning that the cap functions more as a guideline than a regulation; a fact which 
could undermine its effect. Second, by not considering the strength of students enrolling in a 
particular course, the quota has the potential to penalize students enrolling in difficult 
courses with other strong students. The more effectively the cap is enforced, the more it 
creates a disincentive for students to take valuable, upper-level courses in departments.   
C. Mathematical Corrections for Grading Inconsistency 
 
Finally, there are proposals for more precise mathematical adjustments of grades to 
determine a more accurate adjusted GPA or class rank. Such adjustments have rarely made it 
past the proposal stage as they usually face substantial opposition. The most notable example 
is the Duke case, where the grading reform proposal failed by just a handful of votes, due in 
part to the complicated nature of the mathematical adjustment. These proposals do not 
purport to address grading practices themselves (i.e. they don’t directly affect grade inflation) 
but instead are designed to produce alternate, more accurate, GPAs or class ranks.  
i. Linear Adjustment 
 
The most common proposal for mathematically adjusting grades is to linearly adjust 
the grade according to the difficulty of the course. The most basic linear adjustment is based 
upon research done by Goldman and Widawski (1976) and Strenta and Elliot (1987), where 
they found that differences in departmental grading practices were additive (i.e. if Physics 
courses are, on average, 0.2 units of GPA harder than Biology courses and Biology courses 
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are 0.2 units harder than Math courses, then Physics courses will be 0.4 units harder than 
Math courses).  
The proposal of Elliot and Strenta (1988), then, was to determine the additive 
component for each individual course. The adjusted grade would thus be: 
Formula 1: Additive adjustment to grades as per Elliot and Strenta (1988) 
 
Grade Nominal Grade Adjusted +=
The constant (S) in the above formula represents course difficulty—a positive constant 
indicates a relatively difficult course, while a negative constant indicates a more leniently 
graded course. The additive constant was determined by averaging the pair-wise differentials 
between a department and each of the other departments.  
Their proposal has two advantages. First, it does provide a somewhat accurate 
correction for grade inflation. Students are not penalized for taking courses with more 
stringently grading professors; nor are they penalized for taking courses with stronger 
students. Second, it is simple. The concept of adjusting grades upward or downward a bit 
based upon course difficulty is intuitive and the fitting process requires only an 
understanding of basic algebra. 
The proposal, however, does have its drawbacks. First, it would penalize top 
students for taking more leniently graded courses. If a course had an additive factor of -0.5, a 
student could not achieve better than a 3.5 in the course, no matter how well they 
performed. Second, the method fails to account for the manner in which grades are 
distributed. For example, let’s take two courses with the same nine students and both 
courses have a median grade of C. In one course, the grades are distributed such that there 
are 3 A’s, 1 B, 1 C, and 4 D’s (the grades are “spread”). In the other course, there is 1 B, 7 
C’s and 1 D (the grades are “bunched”). The grade of B would be treated identically by the 
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linear adjustment method despite its greatly different meaning. In the first course with 
spread grades, a B appears to represent approximately an average performance. Meanwhile, 
in the second course with bunched grades, a B represents exemplary performance—superior 
to that of the other eight students. 
A more sophisticated fitting procedure is proposed by Caulkin, Larkey and Wei 
(1996) of Carnegie Mellon University. Their linear adjustment fits a line to student ability (T), 
translating ability to a predicted grade for each course: 
Formula 2: Linear adjustment to GPA as per Caulkin, Larkey, and Wei (1996) 
 
 += *Grade Predicted  
The fit is done by minimizing the squared error between this predicted grade and the actual 
grade that the student received. Because both ability of the student and the course difficulty 
parameters are unknown, the authors do the fit iteratively. To begin this iterative process, 
one of the parameters must be assumed—the easiest assumption would be to set ability 
equal to the student’s raw GPA. 
 This method represents a notable improvement upon the simple additive procedure 
previously used. Most importantly, it corrects for differing distributions of grades. The above 
example (which consisted of a course with nine students) showed that the additive method 
did not do well in comparing a course with quite spread grades and a course with tightly 
packed grades. However, the U coefficient within this new linear adjustment formula 
addresses the problem. A small U coefficient deemphasizes student ability in predicting grade 
allowing for a tighter packing of grades. A large U coefficient magnifies differences in 
underlying student abilities producing a greater spread in the distribution of grades. 
 Still, the method has its shortcomings. First, it relies on the strong assumption that 
professors treat the difference between an A and A- the same as between an A- and B+. 
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Undoubtedly, this is true in some cases. However, there are cases where the professor takes 
a more idiosyncratic approach to grading. Let’s consider a hypothetical professor who only 
assigns A’s in truly exceptional cases (when performance far exceeds that of an A-), but 
considers the difference between a B+ and B to be rather trivial. The linear adjustment 
method would treat this distinctions as equivalent when, in fact, they are not. 
 A second, more important, shortcoming is that the method would still penalize top 
students for taking courses with weaker students. Let’s take a hypothetical case where a top 
Mathematics student, Jane, takes a series of difficult courses with top students in the 
department and achieves outstanding grades in all of them, producing a high student ability 
parameter. Jane also has a passion for Art and takes a number of courses in the Art 
department, completing an Art minor. Her work in the department is exemplary—she 
achieves A’s in all of her Art courses. The students in Jane’s Art courses have substantially 
lower ability parameters but still achieve A’s in the same courses she took. In fitting the line, 
Jane’s ability parameter will be dragged down to match more closely to those other students 
who received A’s in Art courses. Thus, while nothing about her performance in the Art 
courses indicated that Jane is a weaker student, her ability parameter (T) falls simply because 
she enrolled in the course. This phenomenon is shown in Figure 2. 
This concern may be relevant to more than just a few top students; there would be a 
disincentive for any above average student to take courses in departments where students 
generally tend to have weaker ability profiles. These students, like Jane, would be forced to 
make the artificial choice between maximizing their ability parameter (and corresponding 
adjusted GPA or class rank) or taking the courses from which they believe they will derive 
the greatest educational benefit.  
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Figure 2: Linear adjustment graph showing potential penalty to top students taking leniently graded courses. 
 
ii. Real vs. Nominal GPA 
 
A proposal by Felton and Koper (2004) is to calculate what they call a “Real GPA”. 
Their proposal focuses on the importance of a student’s standing relative to mean GPA of 
students taking the course (referred to as “Class GPA” within the paper). The formula they 
use to calculate this Real GPA is quite simple: 
Formula 3: Calculation of Real GPA, as per Felton and Koper (2004) 
 
 

	



=
ClassGPA
deStudentGra*2GPA Real  
The result is a series of student grades for courses which center around 2. The proposal 
would certainly curb inflation in grades—it would be impossible to give grades which, on 
average, exceed two points of real GPA for any individual course. Moreover, it would take a 
step toward addressing grading inconsistency—all grades would be reduced to a common 
scale.  
 However, this adjustment for grading inconsistency overlooks one crucial factor: 
variation in student strength by course. While sometimes this variation is minimal, there are 
situations where it can be notable. Consider the case of a senior deciding between an upper-
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level elective and an introductory elective. One is likely to have students with three more 
years of schooling and have far greater background in the subject area, while the other is 
with younger students who may know little or nothing about the subject area prior to the 
course. Yet, Real GPA would only ask how the student ranks relative to other students in 
the course and would reward that student for taking the introductory course. 
 Such a method could, in fact, introduce grading inconsistency where none existed 
previously. Let’s say that a professor is teaching two Economics courses: Microeconomics 
and Macroeconomics. Throughout the semester, the professor determines that the students 
in her Microeconomics course are superior—they turn in higher quality work in a timelier 
manner and are far more informed during class discussions. Accordingly, the professor 
assigns grades at the end of the semester such that the Microeconomics course has a mean 
Class GPA 0.5 higher. In assigning these grades, the professor is conveying information 
about the relative quality of students within the course. Yet this information is lost through 
calculation of Real GPA.  
iii. The Achievement Index 
 
Around ten years ago, a Mathematics professor at Duke, Valen Johnson, developed 
what he terms the “Achievement Index”. Following a controversial debate on the 
implementation of the index, Johnson’s method was rejected mainly because it was deemed 
to be too complicated.  
The index begins with basic assumption that professors are able to accurately order 
students. After that, no assumption is made about the particular shape of the grade 
distributions. Cutoffs for grade levels within each individual course and student ability are 
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determined using Bayesian fitting techniques. The mathematics behind this fitting are 
omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion.4
The Achievement Index does avoid the aforementioned shortcomings of the other 
adjustment techniques. It corrects for inconsistency in grade distributions, and the quality of 
students in each course, such that there is not an excessive penalty for taking courses with 
weaker students (or an excessive reward for taking courses with stronger students). 
Nevertheless, the complicated nature of the technique limits its utility within a university 
setting where the comprehensibility is likely a prerequisite for implementation. 
iv. Other Potential Adjustment Methods 
 
There are other adjustment methods which have not yet been applied to grade data. 
American college hockey ranks teams according to a maximum likelihood process where the 
probability of a team with ability x defeating a team with ability y is simply5:
Formula 4: Probability of a victory according to the American college hockey ranking system 
 
yx
xPwin +
=
This method could be applied to grades by constructing a series of pair-wise “competitions” 
between students in a course. One would treat one student achieving a better grade than 
another as having scored a “win” over that student in the course. The biggest drawback to 
the method is that it struggles to account for unbeatens within the system (in the academic 
case this would be 4.0 students) as their ability parameter would be infinite. There is also the 
difficult question of how the system would deal with ties (i.e. when two students receive the 
same grade in class). 
 
4 For further discussion of Johnson’s fitting technique, see Johnson (1997) and Johnson (2003). 
5 The adjustment method is termed KRACH after its creator. For more information on the technique, see 
the American College Hockey’s website: http://www.uscho.com/rankings/?data=krach. 
32
Another potential avenue for grading adjustment methods would be to consider 
multiple academic ability parameters.  Berry (2006) models professional football using 
separate offense and defense parameters in order to more accurately predict game outcomes. 
Similarly, grades could be predicted by separating different types of academic abilities. A 
possible division could be Math and Verbal (like the SAT) or the degree to which the course 
is paper or exam based. This unexplored avenue could be incorporated within the 
aforementioned linear adjustment procedure as well as Item Response Theory, which will be 
discussed in the following section.  
V. Item Response Theory 
A. Background 
 
Item response theory is designed to measure latent traits—abilities which aren’t 
measured directly, but only indirectly through the application of tests designed to draw upon 
that trait. Item response theory is designed not just to measure these latent traits but also to 
test their consistency between items. 
A typical item response curve looks like this: 
Figure 3: Typical Item Response Curve 
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The curve measures the probability that an individual at a given ability level will correctly 
respond to a dichotomously scored question (meaning that there is no “partial credit”, an 
answer is either right or wrong). Those at low ability levels (points A and B) are unlikely to 
answer the question correctly. Those at high ability levels (points D and E) are quite likely to 
answer the question correctly. An individual at a middle ability level (point C) has about a 
fifty percent chance of answering the question correctly. 
 Looking at the curve, it appears unlikely that we will learn anything which would 
allow us to differentiate abilities A and B or abilities D and E. Instead, the bulk of what we 
learn is concentrated in the middle section between points B and D. In item response theory, 
the term “information” is used to refer to how much a given item (or test question) tells us 
about an individual with a given ability. Figure 4 highlights the ability levels which the 
question tells us the most about.  
Figure 4: Sample IRT curve showing ability ranges where maximum information is obtained about students 
 
The information function can be represented more precisely as a continuous function over 
the same range as the item response curve. An example is shown in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: Sample item response curve shown with the corresponding information curve 
 
Notice that the information function reaches its maximum at the inflection point of the item 
response curve. This convenient fact will make it easier to predict subsequent behavior of 
the information function.  
 A good test, of course, will offer information about students at a variety of ability 
levels. If all questions targeted those at middle ability levels, then we would know a great deal 
about those students but would lack the ability to differentiate the best students from the 
above average students and to differentiate the worst students from the below average 
students. The following graph displays two item response curves which provide information 
on different levels of subjects: 
Figure 6: Two item response curves which provide information on students at different ability levels 
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Of course, not all item response curves have the same shape. As the graph above indicates, 
curves can be centered anywhere along the ability axis, as well as possessing different slopes. 
The curve shown in Figure 5, for example, is also far steeper than the curve shown in Figure 
6. Steeper curves offer information about individuals within a narrow band of ability but 
provide more information about these individuals. Shallower curves offer information about 
individuals within a broader ability range but provide less information about them. The 
difference in the shape of the information functions can be seen in Figures 7 and 8.  
Figure 7: An item response curve with a steeper information function. 
 
Figures 8: An item response curve with a flatter information function. 
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One last convenient feature of information curves is that they can be summed between 
items. This allows for the use of individual items to target different levels of ability, which 
taken together allow the entirety of the test to distinguish between individuals at all levels. 
 
B. Application of IRT to Grades 
 
The application of IRT to grades is not entirely obvious since they are not 
dichotomous outcomes. However, whether or not a student successfully reaches a particular 
grade threshold can be treated as a dichotomous outcome. John Young, the one scholar who 
has applied item response theory to grades (Young 1989; Young 1990), uses A, B, and C as 
the grade cutoffs. There is nothing about the procedure which restricts one to consideration 
of those particular grade cutoffs—those were simply the cutoffs which Young found to be 
most convenient. A sample graph is shown below with students at three different ability 
levels. 
Figure 9: Sample IRT curves for grades of A, B and C with three sample students shown 
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Looking at the first student (Lee), we see that Lee is unlikely to achieve either an A or B 
within the course (the curves cross the ability line at a very low probability). However, Lee is 
more likely to achieve at least a C (the ability line crosses the item response curve for a grade 
of C at a higher probability. Thus, we would predict that Lee would receive a C in the 
course. Using similar logic, we would expect Mary to receive a B, and Ned to receive either 
an A or B.  
The application of IRT to each individual class produces a set of item response 
curves which provides information about a range of student abilities. However, not all 
courses will have this convenient distribution where the curves are spaced to maximize 
information about students. The following graph shows what a set of curves would look like 
if a professor refused to give C’s except under exceptional circumstances (by jumping 
straight from B to D in assigning grades).  
Figure 10: IRT curve for a sample course showing a bunching of the item response curves for the grades of B 
and C, indicating a reluctance of the professor to assign the grade of C 
 
The proximity of the B and C curves indicates that an individual student will have 
approximately the same probability of receiving a B (or C) or better. In order for there to be 
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C’s distributed to students, we must observe a gap between the B and C curves and this only 
occurs at a small sliver of ability levels. 
The necessity of correcting for grading inconsistency can be seen from the following 
graph where two classes are compared (one in blue and one in red), where a B in the blue 
class represents a better performance than an A in the red class, and a C in the blue class 
represents a better performance than a B in the red class. 
Figure 11: Item response curves demonstrating the importance of adjusting for grading inconsistency 
C. Mathematics Underlying IRT 
 
Thus far I’ve only spoken about the basic graphical qualities of IRT. Now I’d like to 
introduce the underlying mathematics. The basic formula for an IRT curve has three 
variables6:
Formula 5: Expression for the basic item response curve 
)(1
1
 +
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e
Pcorrect  
6 It should be noted that although the item response function is described in this section, the fitting technique 
is not. This discussion is omitted to avoid unnecessary distraction. All fitting techniques for IRT use some sort 
of maximum likelihood estimation. The best fitting techniques are marginal maximum likelihood estimation 
(MMLE) and the EM (ExpectationMaximization) algorithm. For more information on these two approaches, 
see Baker (1992). 
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T is the parameter which estimates the ability of an individual student. S is known as the 
difficulty parameter and is used to determine where the curve is centered.  
Figure 12: An item response curve showing the horizontal shift with changes in the value of S.
When T and S are equal the probability that a student will answer the question correctly (or 
reach a particular grade threshold) is one-half: 
Calculation 1: Showing how D, the difficulty parameter, functions 
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The ability level where T is equal to S is also where the inflection point occurs in the item 
response curve and, thus, the curve is at its steepest slope. This is the point at which the item 
response curve provides the greatest amount of information about the ability of the student. 
 The U parameter is known as the discrimination parameter. U determines the slope of 
the curve—a high value of U will produce a steeper item response curve and a lower value of 
U will produce a shallower curve. The following figure shows how this U value affects the 
shape of the item response curve: 
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Figure 13: Sample item response curves showing change in steepness as the value of U varies 
 
Because the U parameter determines the slope of the item response curve, it correspondingly 
determines the shape of the information function. As explained earlier, a shallower curve, 
which is produced by a lower U value, will produce a wider, flatter information curve. A 
steeper curve, produced by a larger U value, will produce a narrower, steeper information 
curve7.
There are a few variations of the previously described two parameter logistic curve8.
The first variation is a one parameter model known as the Rasch model. The Rasch model 
holds the discrimination parameter (U) constant and only fits the curve to the difficulty 
parameter (S).  
The second variation is the three parameter model which adds an additional 
“guessing” parameter to the two parameter model. The “guessing” parameter, c, is designed 
for multiple choice tests where the probability of getting the correct response asymptotically 
approaches c instead of zero. For example, in a multiple choice test with four possible 
responses, an individual’s probability of correctly answering should approach 0.25, as shown 
 
7 The formula for the information curve is: 
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8 It is referred to as a two parameter model because only the > and ? parameters determine the shape of the 
curve. The third variable, ability (@), is the independent variable and, thus, is not considered a parameter in 
the construction of the model.  
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in Figure 12 (unless answer responses successfully trick respondents into choosing wrong 
answers with higher frequency). 
Figure 14: Sample three parameter IRT curve with a “guessing parameter” equal to 0.25 
 
The inclusion of this third parameter impacts some of the aforementioned convenient 
features of the item response curve. First, the inflection point still occurs when ability (T) is 
equal to the difficulty parameter (S), but it occurs at a probability of (1-c)/2 instead of at 0.5. 
Second, it complicates the calculation of the information function. 
Neither model will be used in this paper. The Rasch model’s failure to account for 
variations in item discrimination makes it overly simplistic. The three parameter model on 
the other hand introduces an unnecessary parameter—with grades there is no equivalent to 
guessing, if a student does particularly poor work, or doesn’t even do the work, then they 
will fail to achieve all grade levels except F (which doesn’t constitute achieving a grade level 
but represents a failure to achieve any passing grade level). The three parameter model also 
undermines some of the convenient mathematical properties of the two parameter model, 
complicating the calculation of both the item response curve and the information function.  
The final variation is that some authors use a normal ogive curve (which has the 
same shape as a cumulative normal distribution) instead of a logistic curve (Lord and Novick 
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1968). The fitting of the curve is not substantially different—indeed if adjusted by a 
multiplicative factor, the normal ogive will produce almost an identical fit to that of a logistic 
curve (Baker 1992). The mathematical convenience of a logistic function, however, makes it 
preferable for use in fitting grade data. 
D. Comparative Advantages of IRT 
 
IRT has a few comparative advantages as a grade adjustment technique. First, and 
most importantly, it corrects for irregular distributions of grades (when grades are either 
skewed in some way or irregularly clumped). By treating each grade level as a dichotomous 
outcome with an independently determined distribution, no problematic assumptions are 
made about the relative difference between an A and A-, and a A- and B+. Other adjustment 
methods, such as linear adjustment, assume that the distance between grade intervals is 
uniform. 
 Second, IRT never penalizes students for receiving an A in a course. While some 
adjustment methods penalize top students for taking easier courses and receiving an A, IRT 
ensures that a top grade can only benefit a student—only when they fail to achieve an A can 
their ability parameter fall. Thus, while a student will benefit more from receiving an A in a 
more severely graded course, there is no disincentive to taking a more leniently graded 
course if the student believes that the course would be beneficial educationally. I should note 
that this argument relies on the minimax criteria (minimizing the maximum error of all 
student ability estimates) for model selection as opposed to the traditional least squares 
approach. This is because it is the cases of bias where pressures are created to alter course 
selection, such as that shown in Figure 2.   
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The study by Caulkin, Larkey, and Wei (1996) found that the linear adjustment 
notably outperformed IRT using least squares as the criteria (the R2 of adjusted GPA relative 
to exogenous measures of student ability was 0.321 for linear adjustment and 0.264 for IRT). 
Besides not being the appropriate criteria for comparing adjustment methods, I believe there 
are two shortcomings within their study. First, it used exogenous measures of student 
performance, which are subject to the limitations discussed earlier. The low R2 value for each 
of the adjustment techniques demonstrates these shortcomings. Second, their 
implementation of IRT relied upon the methodology outlined in Young (1989), which uses 
grade cutoffs of A, B and C. By only using these cutoffs, valuable information on student 
performance is lost. No distinction is made between an A- and a B+ or a B+ and a B. In 
practice, this is where professors do the bulk of their sorting among students, as shown in 
the following table which shows the distribution of grades received by Macalester students in 
all courses. 
Table 5: Grade distribution for all students at Macalester, Fall 2001-Fall 2005 
 
Grade 
Fall  
2001 
Fall  
2002 
Fall  
2003 
Fall  
2004 
Fall  
2005 
A 24% 28% 26% 26% 28% 
A- 20 21 22 23 25 
B+ 18 17 17 18 17 
B 14 14 14 14 13 
B- 7 5 6 6 5 
C+ 3 3 3 2 2 
C 3 3 3 2 2
C- 1 1 1 1 1 
D+ * * * * * 
D 1 * * * 1
D- * * * * * 
NC 1 1 1 1 1 
I 2 1 1 2 1
SC 6 6 6 5 5 
GPA 3.34 3.39 3.39 3.40 3.43 
Source: Institutional Research, Macalester College.  
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Third, IRT produces an information function which can serve as a useful resource 
for faculty. If, at the end of each semester, faculty members were provided with a report on 
their grading which includes the information function for each of their courses, they would 
be able to see which students they are sorting well and which students they are sorting 
poorly. A professor could then choose to adjust grading practices accordingly. 
 Fourth, IRT is potentially more acceptable than other adjustment techniques 
involving complicated mathematics, such as the Achievement Index, for two reasons. First, 
the item response curve behaves intuitively (the probability of a student answering a 
question correctly, or achieving a particular grade level, increases as their ability parameter 
increases) and this behavior can be shown graphically. Accordingly, the method can be 
explained and (more or less) comprehended without a complete understanding of the 
underlying mathematics. Second, IRT is currently used to calibrate standardized tests such as 
the SAT. While few people are aware of this, I believe that this use of IRT can be cited as 
evidence of the method’s efficacy as well as its acceptance within a portion of the academic 
community. Thus, although the Achievement Index shares many of the advantages of IRT, I 
believe that IRT is a superior method.  
VI. Simulation to Show Efficacy of Grade Adjustment Techniques 
 
Although the previous section provided arguments as to why item response theory is 
the best method to adjust for grading inconsistency, this is not to imply that the other 
adjustment techniques surveyed earlier in the paper are bad techniques. Indeed, a number of 
those techniques are at least moderately effective at adjusting for grade inflation and/or 
grading inconsistency. Accordingly, this section of the paper will demonstrate the efficacy of 
one of those techniques—linear adjustment. This efficacy will be shown through a 
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simulation where grades for entire departments are raised or lowered in order to create 
substantial inconsistency9. The question then is to see if linear adjustment is accurately able 
to sort out this artificially imposed “noise”. Data for this section is drawn from the 
Macalester College Registrar. The data set includes 442 students who graduated as part of 
the Class of 2005 at Macalester.   
 Before delving into the analysis of linear adjustment, a brief review of the method is 
in order. The method works by calculating a predicted grade according to a linear fit of a 
latent ability parameter.  
 
 += *Grade Predicted  
The method then seeks to minimize the squared error between this predicted grade and the 
actual grade received by each of the students within the course. Because both student ability 
(T) and the course parameters (U and S) are unknown, this fit must be done iteratively. The 
initial value used within this iterative fit is that we assume that student ability is equal to 
GPA-based class rank. This, of course, is not a very accurate measurement of student ability 
but error in this initial estimation will rapidly be eliminated by the iterative process. 
In the simulation, all grades within the Chemistry department were raised by three 
points, all grades in the Psychology department were raised by two points, and all grades in 
the Math and Biology departments were lowered by three points. This alteration quite 
effectively skewed GPA-based student rank such that there appears to be little correlation 
between a student’s new GPA-based class rank and the original GPA-based class rank. In 
the following scatterplots, student performance is measured by student ranking where 442 
represents the highest student ranking and 1 represents the lowest student ranking. 
 
9 This simulation was done jointly with Professor Danny Kaplan at Macalester College. Programming for 
the simulation was done using the statistics package, R.  
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Figure 15: Scatterplot showing correlation between GPA-based class rank prior to and following 
experimental imposition of the inconsistency. 
 
However, application of the linear adjustment method to this grade data greatly 
decreases the spread imposed by the addition of this grading inconsistency. The method 
appears to have moved points which were skewed substantially one way or another back 
toward the line where the unaltered rank is equal to the altered rank (along this line there is 
no inconsistency). 
Figure 16: Scatterplot showing correlation between adjusted class rank prior to and following experimental 
imposition of the inconsistency.  
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This correction is quite impressive given the magnitude of the inconsistency imposed. When 
one considers that inconsistency in actual grade data is rarely so extreme, linear adjustment 
method is only likely to perform better when applied to such data. 
The simulation provides strong support for the use of linear adjustment of grades in 
determining class rank. It shows that the method is able to correct for a substantial portion 
of grading inconsistency, providing a more accurate understanding of student performance. 
Thus, the question is not whether it is possible to correct for grading inconsistency, but 
simply what the best method is to do so.  
VII. Conclusion 
A. Summary 
 
This paper identifies three primary reasons why adjustments for grading 
inconsistency are necessary. First, unadjusted grades provide a misleading evaluation of 
student performance which can produce artificial pressure on student course selection. 
Second, unadjusted grades make outside evaluation of academic performance difficult. 
Potential employers are deprived of the information they need to choose the most qualified 
candidate, and are left to rely on ‘old boys’ networks to select employees, further 
disadvantaging traditionally disadvantaged groups. Third, a lack of grade adjustment 
increases pressure on professors to assign high grades in exchange for positive course 
evaluations and higher course enrollments in future semesters. This process can undermine 
professorial autonomy in assigning grades, decreasing the ability of grades to serve as an 
effective motivational tool.  
 In response to these shortcomings, a handful of universities around the country have 
taken action to address grade inflation and/or grading inconsistency. These efforts have had 
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mixed success; most see little or no change in grading practices post-reform. The problem is 
that most reforms require changes in the practice of assigning grades itself. This is a weaker 
approach because it both fails to account for the pressures which professors face in 
assigning grades and can limit the freedom of professors to assign grades in order to 
optimize their classroom environment.  
 More mathematical approaches to grading inconsistency, such as calculation of “Real 
GPA”, the “Achievement Index”, and linear adjustments, have also been proposed. Real 
GPA and linear adjustments suffer from limitations which ensure that they will inaccurately 
correct for grading inconsistency, either providing a misleading evaluation of student 
performance or creating disincentives to take particular courses based upon the grade 
distribution given by that particular professor. On the other extreme, the Achievement Index 
has been rejected for its mathematical complexity, which engenders opposition when 
implementation at a college or university is proposed.  
 Within this context item response theory (IRT) is offered as a solution to grading 
inconsistency. IRT would not require any change in grading practices; it would simply 
provide an adjusted ranking to aid in interpreting grades which have already been assigned. 
Moreover, IRT is not subject to the criticisms of bias in adjustment leveled against Real 
GPA and linear adjustments. Finally, IRT is a more acceptable mathematical technique. It is 
based in broadly accepted test theory, decreasing the odds that it will meet opposition in 
implementation due to mathematical complexity.  
B. Recommendations 
 
Based upon the preceding analysis, I believe that Macalester would benefit from 
using IRT to adjust for grading inconsistency. The change would be relatively minor: 
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transcripts would simply carry an additional piece of information, the student’s IRT-based 
adjusted class rank. The rest of the transcript would remain unchanged. While the 
adjustment process would be simple, the implications would be notable. With academic 
performance better contextualized, the disincentive to take more severely graded courses 
would be reduced or removed altogether. This adjusted class rank would more accurately 
reflect student performance, better informing potential employers. Professors would likely 
receive less pressure from students to distribute high grades as relative standing (to other 
students) in a course would be more important than absolute standing (the grade itself).  
 Beyond these improvements in the educational process, Macalester would stand to 
benefit from taking a leading role among its cohorts in adjusting for grading inconsistency. 
The schools which have taken action to address, primarily, grade inflation (such as the 
University of Colorado, Harvard, and Princeton) have received extensive, mostly positive, 
publicity. The public perception is that addressing problems with grading is a forward-
thinking strategy which shows that the school is both daring and shrewd. Macalester, 
however, has the opportunity to advance beyond the basic approaches tried at other schools 
and implement a policy which focuses on grading inconsistency, instead of just grade 
inflation and avoids the pitfalls of less appropriate grading remedies.  
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